The European Parliament approved the Council's position on draft amending budget No 2/2026, which increases payments by 8.004 billion euros, including 5.4 billion for cohesion and 2.2 billion for CAP strategic plans. The text is definitively adopted and will be published in the Official Journal. It also provides 53 posts for the Ukraine loan and a reinforced agricultural reserve of 300 million euros.
The Union budget for 2026 was under pressure: the backlog of 2025 payments in cohesion and the acceleration of programme implementation created cash needs. The Commission proposed an amending budget to adjust revenue and expenditure. Parliament approved the Council's position, which closes the budgetary procedure for this amending budget.
Cohesion payments +5.4 billionPayment appropriations for cohesion programmes increase from their initial level by 5.4 billion euros, in order to pay beneficiaries and regions more quickly.
CAP payments +2.2 billionPayment appropriations for CAP strategic plans (EAFRD) increase by 2.2 billion euros, to support farmers and rural development.
Agricultural reserve +300 millionThe agricultural reserve is reinforced by 300 million euros to help farmers facing severe liquidity shortages, and the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) is increased by 140 million euros.
53 posts for the Ukraine loanManaging the Ukraine support loan requires 53 jobs, including 41 beyond the permanent staff, with an estimated budgetary impact of 3.2 million euros for six months in 2026.
Revenue: +4.36 billion GNIMember States' contributions based on gross national income (GNI) increase by 4,364.9 million euros compared with draft amending budget No 1/2026, and own resources other than GNI increase by 2,997.9 million euros.
Parliament adopted the text by 440 votes in favour, 127 against and 104 abstentions (electronic roll-call vote).
In practice, regions and farmers will benefit from faster and higher payments in 2026: 5.4 billion euros more for cohesion and 2.2 billion for CAP strategic plans. The agricultural reserve is reinforced by 300 million euros to deal with crises. The EU budget is also adjusted to finance the Ukraine loan, with 53 posts and 1 million euros in support expenditure. Member States will contribute more through the GNI resource, amounting to 4.36 billion euros more. The text is definitively adopted and will be published in the Official Journal.
Draft amending budget No 2/2026 is adopted: 8.004 billion euros in additional payments, including 5.4 billion for cohesion and 2.2 billion for the CAP strategic plans. Regions and farmers will be paid faster, but the bill lands on member states through the GNI resource, to the tune of 4.36 billion euros. Parliament approves without correcting the mechanism that makes the national taxpayer the residual financier of every gap.
The 2025 payment backlog in cohesion, combined with the acceleration of implementation, puts the 2026 budget under pressure. The Commission therefore proposes to increase payments by 8 billion euros. Parliament approves and welcomes the progress in implementation. But who pays? The member states, through the GNI resource, for 4.3649 billion euros more than in draft amending budget No 1/2026. Regions and farmers are paid faster, which is good news for their cash flow. The bad news is that this catch-up does not fix the cause: a rigid annual budget, poorly calibrated multiannual programmes and a Commission managing cash flow day by day.
The mechanism is simple: when payments fall behind, credits accumulate; when they speed up, fresh money is needed. Member states are called in to help, with no room to manoeuvre on the timetable or the amounts. An approach based on subsidiarity would have meant letting national and regional managing authorities bear responsibility for payment schedules, with predictable envelopes and clear carry-over rules, rather than centralising cash flow in Brussels and sending the bill back to the capitals.
The support loan to Ukraine requires new financial and legal expertise. The Commission requests 53 posts, including 41 beyond the permanent staff, at a cost of 3.2 million euros over six months in 2026. Parliament takes note and stresses that the principle of keeping staff numbers unchanged on a voluntary basis has proved counterproductive. It is right to say so: an institution given a new mission must be able to recruit, otherwise it diverts staff from other tasks. But we must also ask why such a structure is necessary. A loan guaranteed by the member states could be managed by a public bank or by the European Investment Bank, with lower administrative costs and clear accountability. The Commission prefers to internalise it, which expands its scope and its budget.
These costs are financed by drawing on the flexibility instrument (1 million euros) and the single margin facility (3.2 million euros). In other words, existing margins, already very thin, are being tapped. Parliament rightly worries about this, but it does not propose to scale back. It calls for new own resources, up to 60 billion euros a year. That is a political position, not an operational rule. A liberal alternative would have been to condition this spending on equivalent savings in other lines, or to finance it through internal redeployments, rather than through new European taxes.
Regions and farmers are paid faster, but member states pay more, without ever being able to challenge the mechanism.
Draft amending budget No 2/2026 is adopted: 8.004 billion euros in additional payments, including 5.4 billion for cohesion and 2.2 billion for the CAP strategic plans. Regions and farmers will be paid faster, but the bill lands on member states through the GNI resource, to the tune of 4.36 billion euros. Parliament approves without correcting the mechanism that makes the national taxpayer the residual financier of every gap.
The 2025 payment backlog in cohesion, combined with the acceleration of implementation, puts the 2026 budget under pressure. The Commission therefore proposes to increase payments by 8 billion euros. Parliament approves and welcomes the progress in implementation. But who pays? The member states, through the GNI resource, for 4.3649 billion euros more than in draft amending budget No 1/2026. Regions and farmers are paid faster, which is good news for their cash flow. The bad news is that this catch-up does not fix the cause: a rigid annual budget, poorly calibrated multiannual programmes and a Commission managing cash flow day by day.
The mechanism is simple: when payments fall behind, credits accumulate; when they speed up, fresh money is needed. Member states are called in to help, with no room to manoeuvre on the timetable or the amounts. An approach based on subsidiarity would have meant letting national and regional managing authorities bear responsibility for payment schedules, with predictable envelopes and clear carry-over rules, rather than centralising cash flow in Brussels and sending the bill back to the capitals.
The support loan to Ukraine requires new financial and legal expertise. The Commission requests 53 posts, including 41 beyond the permanent staff, at a cost of 3.2 million euros over six months in 2026. Parliament takes note and stresses that the principle of keeping staff numbers unchanged on a voluntary basis has proved counterproductive. It is right to say so: an institution given a new mission must be able to recruit, otherwise it diverts staff from other tasks. But we must also ask why such a structure is necessary. A loan guaranteed by the member states could be managed by a public bank or by the European Investment Bank, with lower administrative costs and clear accountability. The Commission prefers to internalise it, which expands its scope and its budget.
These costs are financed by drawing on the flexibility instrument (1 million euros) and the single margin facility (3.2 million euros). In other words, existing margins, already very thin, are being tapped. Parliament rightly worries about this, but it does not propose to scale back. It calls for new own resources, up to 60 billion euros a year. That is a political position, not an operational rule. A liberal alternative would have been to condition this spending on equivalent savings in other lines, or to finance it through internal redeployments, rather than through new European taxes.
Regions and farmers are paid faster, but member states pay more, without ever being able to challenge the mechanism.