The European Parliament approved the Council's position on the revision of the bank crisis management framework (BRRD3). The text is adopted in the version agreed with EU governments. It must now be signed and published in the Official Journal to become law.
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) sets out the rules for intervening when a bank is in difficulty. In 2023, the Commission proposed a revision of this framework, covering in particular early intervention measures, the conditions for triggering a resolution procedure and the financing of resolution measures. After negotiations with the Council, a provisional agreement was reached. Parliament approved this agreement without making any changes to it.
Approval of the Council's positionParliament approves the Council's position at first reading, without amendment. The text is therefore adopted in the version agreed by EU governments.
Signature and publication of the actThe President of Parliament will sign the act together with the President of the Council. The Secretary General of Parliament will then sign the act after verification of the procedures and will arrange for its publication in the Official Journal together with the Secretary General of the Council.
Transmission to the institutionsThe President of Parliament will forward Parliament's position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
No change to the thresholdsParliament did not change the thresholds, dates or scope of the text compared with the Council's position. The final rules are those agreed with the governments.
The text was adopted. No roll-call vote took place; adoption was by show of hands or without individual counting of votes.
This revision of the bank crisis management framework aims to better protect deposits and to prevent taxpayers from paying for banks in difficulty. The new rules, which will enter into force after their publication, will apply to EU banks and their customers. They concern early intervention measures, the conditions for triggering a resolution and the financing of resolution measures. In practice, authorities will have updated tools to intervene before a bank becomes insolvent and to organise an orderly resolution if necessary.
The European Parliament approved without amendment the Council's position on the revision of the bank crisis management framework (BRRD3). The text is adopted in the version agreed with governments, with no change to thresholds, dates or scope. A first-reading approval that closes the file on Parliament's side and leaves intact the final rules negotiated between states.
Parliament did not rewrite the bank resolution directive. It endorsed the Council's position without touching it. Early intervention measures, the conditions for triggering a resolution and the financing of resolution measures remain as governments set them. For banks and their customers, the framework is now fixed: authorities will have updated tools to intervene before insolvency and to organise an orderly resolution.
This approval without amendment has a simple consequence: the thresholds and financing mechanisms were not changed by Parliament. The rules that will apply are those negotiated between member states, not those a parliamentary majority might have wanted. The cost of this method is clear: elected representatives did not have to publicly own technical choices that nonetheless commit depositors' and taxpayers' money.
The stated objective is to better protect deposits and prevent taxpayers from paying for banks in difficulty. The mechanism is well known: early intervention measures must make it possible to act before the bank becomes insolvent, and the financing of resolution must be borne by the sector, not by the public budget. But without any change to the thresholds or trigger conditions, the balance between stability and individual responsibility remains the one set by governments.
For a mid-sized bank, the question is not the principle of orderly resolution, but the cost and speed of procedures. A framework that multiplies early intervention steps can delay the decision and let losses run. Conversely, too early a trigger can stigmatise a viable institution. The adopted text does not resolve this dilemma beyond what the Council has already decided.
To approve without amending is to leave it to governments to decide who pays when a bank wobbles.
The European Parliament approved without amendment the Council's position on the revision of the bank crisis management framework (BRRD3). The text is adopted in the version agreed with governments, with no change to thresholds, dates or scope. A first-reading approval that closes the file on Parliament's side and leaves intact the final rules negotiated between states.
Parliament did not rewrite the bank resolution directive. It endorsed the Council's position without touching it. Early intervention measures, the conditions for triggering a resolution and the financing of resolution measures remain as governments set them. For banks and their customers, the framework is now fixed: authorities will have updated tools to intervene before insolvency and to organise an orderly resolution.
This approval without amendment has a simple consequence: the thresholds and financing mechanisms were not changed by Parliament. The rules that will apply are those negotiated between member states, not those a parliamentary majority might have wanted. The cost of this method is clear: elected representatives did not have to publicly own technical choices that nonetheless commit depositors' and taxpayers' money.
The stated objective is to better protect deposits and prevent taxpayers from paying for banks in difficulty. The mechanism is well known: early intervention measures must make it possible to act before the bank becomes insolvent, and the financing of resolution must be borne by the sector, not by the public budget. But without any change to the thresholds or trigger conditions, the balance between stability and individual responsibility remains the one set by governments.
For a mid-sized bank, the question is not the principle of orderly resolution, but the cost and speed of procedures. A framework that multiplies early intervention steps can delay the decision and let losses run. Conversely, too early a trigger can stigmatise a viable institution. The adopted text does not resolve this dilemma beyond what the Council has already decided.
To approve without amending is to leave it to governments to decide who pays when a bank wobbles.
