The European Parliament approved without amendment the position of the Member States on the protection of bank deposits, the use of funds from deposit guarantee schemes, cross-border cooperation and transparency. The text is therefore adopted in the version validated by the governments of the Union. This is the final text negotiated with the Member States; they must still give their formal approval before the law applies.
In 2023, the European Commission had proposed a revision of the directive on deposit guarantee schemes, which protect savers when a bank fails. This revision concerned the scope of protection, the use of guarantee funds, cooperation between national authorities and transparency. After negotiations with the Council, a provisional agreement was reached. Parliament was called upon to decide on the official position of the Member States, which takes up this agreement.
Adoption of the final textParliament approves the Council's position at first reading, without amending it. The text is adopted in the version validated by the Member States.
Signature and publicationThe President of Parliament will sign the act together with the President of the Council. The Secretary General of Parliament will then sign the act after verification of the procedures, and will then arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union together with the Secretary General of the Council.
Transmission to the institutionsThe President of Parliament will forward Parliament's position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
Parliament adopted the Council's position without a roll-call vote (show of hands or approval without individual count). No figures for votes in favour, against or abstentions are available.
This decision directly concerns savers in the European Union: the rules on the protection of bank deposits, the use of guarantee funds in the event of a bank failure, cooperation between national authorities and transparency are now set in the version approved by the Member States. The final text must still receive the formal approval of the Council before becoming law. Once published, it will apply in all countries of the Union in accordance with the arrangements laid down in the revised directive.
By approving without amendment the Council's position on the revision of the deposit guarantee schemes directive, the European Parliament has chosen not to influence the final content. Savers will inherit rules negotiated between governments, without their direct representatives having changed a single comma. Behind the facade of unanimity, this is a missed opportunity to simplify a mechanism that remains costly and slow.
The procedure is revealing: Parliament had adopted a position at first reading, then a provisional agreement was reached with the Council. Rather than reopening the text, MEPs endorsed the member states' position. This choice has a direct consequence: the rules governing deposit guarantee, the use of funds in the event of bank failure and cooperation between national authorities are those that governments deemed acceptable, not those that Parliament had defended.
The absence of a roll-call vote makes it impossible to know which groups supported this surrender. A show of hands leaves no trace. For citizens seeking to understand how their representatives defended their interests, this is one more layer of opacity. Transparency, although written into the title of the file, stops at the doors of the chamber.
The revised directive sets the rules of the game: which deposits are covered, how guarantee funds may be used (notably for resolution measures), how national authorities cooperate when a bank operates in several countries, and what information is published. All these issues determine the speed and cost of a bank failure. Yet, by validating the Council's position without modification, Parliament did not seek to lighten information obligations, speed up procedures or reduce banks' contributions. The final text remains that of an intergovernmental compromise, with its share of complexity.
For banks, every new transparency or cooperation requirement represents compliance costs that are passed on to customers. For savers, protection is real, but the mechanism remains dependent on the ability of national authorities to act quickly. An approach based on subsidiarity could have left more room for national regulators to adapt the rules to the size and risk of their banks, rather than imposing a uniform framework.
By approving without a word, Parliament turns deposit guarantee into a matter for governments.
By approving without amendment the Council's position on the revision of the deposit guarantee schemes directive, the European Parliament has chosen not to influence the final content. Savers will inherit rules negotiated between governments, without their direct representatives having changed a single comma. Behind the facade of unanimity, this is a missed opportunity to simplify a mechanism that remains costly and slow.
The procedure is revealing: Parliament had adopted a position at first reading, then a provisional agreement was reached with the Council. Rather than reopening the text, MEPs endorsed the member states' position. This choice has a direct consequence: the rules governing deposit guarantee, the use of funds in the event of bank failure and cooperation between national authorities are those that governments deemed acceptable, not those that Parliament had defended.
The absence of a roll-call vote makes it impossible to know which groups supported this surrender. A show of hands leaves no trace. For citizens seeking to understand how their representatives defended their interests, this is one more layer of opacity. Transparency, although written into the title of the file, stops at the doors of the chamber.
The revised directive sets the rules of the game: which deposits are covered, how guarantee funds may be used (notably for resolution measures), how national authorities cooperate when a bank operates in several countries, and what information is published. All these issues determine the speed and cost of a bank failure. Yet, by validating the Council's position without modification, Parliament did not seek to lighten information obligations, speed up procedures or reduce banks' contributions. The final text remains that of an intergovernmental compromise, with its share of complexity.
For banks, every new transparency or cooperation requirement represents compliance costs that are passed on to customers. For savers, protection is real, but the mechanism remains dependent on the ability of national authorities to act quickly. An approach based on subsidiarity could have left more room for national regulators to adapt the rules to the size and risk of their banks, rather than imposing a uniform framework.
By approving without a word, Parliament turns deposit guarantee into a matter for governments.
